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1962/11/05

When the President, in his letter to Khrushchev of 27 October

1. When the President, in his letter to Khrushchev of 27 October, gave "assurances against invasion of Cuba" in consideration of the Soviet removal of offensive weapons in Cuba under UN supervision, Operation Mongoose was on its death bed. When the President stated in his letter of 28 October to Khrushchev, "I consider my letter to you of 27 October and your reply of today as a firm undertaking on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out" Operation Mongoose disd.

- 2. If these agreements are carried out it seems clear that
  Cuba will be dealt with as another denied area in a manner differing
  not greatly from that in which CIA handles other denied areas. If
  the agreements are not carried out, military action cannot long be
  delayed. In either event the Mongoose structure as it has now existed
  in Government is through.
  - 3. Looking back to the origins of Mongoose one finds the Attorney General and Mr. McNamara seeking primarily to remove the political stain left on the President by the Bay of Pigs failure. Both the A. G. and the Secretary of Defense felt it necessary for political reasons that some action Marko be taken with respect to Cuba to insure the President's future. In a nutshell, they were out to dump Castro or to make him cooperate.
  - 4. During the past year, while one of the options of the project was to create internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not only shied away from the military intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals. The only senior official involved, outside the Agency, who thought in terms of military action was Maxwell Taylor. Others like the Attorney General, McNamara, Gilpatric, Johnson and later Bundy viewed the project in a strictly political light. Hindsight must now reveal to others, as well as it has to us, that a Chief of Operations (i. e. Lansdale) was never actually needed.
  - 5. At present no senior U.S. Government official around town is interested in a future "Cuban Affairs Special Group." Bundy has already suggested the creation in State of an "Office of Cuban Exile Affairs" or "Free Cuban Affairs" which in itself is a move outside of the Mongoose structure. All clandestine activities on the part of

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
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TFW continue at a stand down. Significant steps have been taken by the Agency together with the military for contingency planning. USIA has moved into the propaganda field under State guidance without relation to the Mongoose structure. Mongoose can only live again through "resurrection."

- 6. Given these circumstances and in the light of great pressures elsewhere in the world CIA, internally, should move with great rapidity to distance Task Force W from any external access. This would involve regularizing or institutionalizing TFW in order that this unique group which has been available to Lansdale as a "whipping boy" becomes a normal part of our monolithic Agency structure. By such a move, neither Lansdale nor anyone else could get at these resources without going through regular channels. Within CIA we would return Cuba to the Western Hemisphere and treat Cuba as a denied area and relate it to over-all WH problems. (Throughout Project Mongoose, this is precisely the manner in which State has handled the problem. As a result Lansdale never felt that he had troops in State as he did in CIA.)
- 7. In accomplishing this, the only analogy I can think of is a corporate one. We should not go through bankruptcy which would have to be announced, but rather pass TFW through an unpublicized receivership and reorganization. The need to realign manpower and assets for demands in other areas would be sufficient reason in itself. The current stand down is a perfect setting for such a change in
- 8. Concurrently, the DCI should endorse Bundy's suggestion and he should encourage the immediate establishment of an Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in State. This would relieve CIA of one of the most annoying and insoluble problems we have faced. This would place problems of proposed Cuban Government structures, provisional governments, platforms, exile politics, and the like, right where they belong - in the Department of State.
- 9. Absolutely no attempt on our part should be made to unseat Lausdale. Remember that the Attorney General was fighting Lausdale's battle as recently as two weeks ago. Secondly, McNamara and Gilpatric still look upon Lansdale as something of a mystic and are

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on the defensive by virture of his relationship with the Attorney
General. Practically everyone at the operating level agrees that
Lanedale has lost his value. Bundy and Taylor are not impressed
with him. Bill Quinn and company obviously have his number as do
we. With a political solution to the Guban problem in hand reflecting
great credit on the part of the President, the A.G. will drop Lanedale
like a hot brick. Therefore, while awaiting the outcome of the Guban
talks, we must at once deny Lanedale direct access to TFW.
Lanedale can have access as to all other CIA components through
the DCI during the stand down period.

- 10. Lansdale's reaction to any reassignment is apt to be a violent one. He undoubtedly realizes that he never again will be in the position of a special advisor to the two most powerful men in the country. Therefore, if we don't close ranks within CIA and put TFW beyond his reach without delay (except through the DCI) he might be able to inflict serious damage to CIA's standing before his eventual demise.
  - 11. To summarize, the following action is required:
  - a. Internally, institutionalize TFW. Graft it into WH. (Defense will then look to DIA for intelligence and DIA to us.)
  - b. Push (through the DCI and Bundy) for the immediate establishment of the Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in the Department of State.

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